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Abstract:
After experiencing nearly 20 years of increases in national recycling rates, the recycling
rates in some developed countries have leveled off at between 20% and 30% over the
past decade. If recycling rates have reached some sort of steady state, then the relevant
policy question is whether the observed steady state is socially optimal. Data obtained
both in the United States and Japan suggest that the net social costs of recycling either
remain constant (in Japan) or fall with increases in the recycling rate above 8% (in the
United States). Policies that serve to increase the recycling rate over existing levels
would therefore be socially beneficial. Results also suggest that the net private costs of
recycling – those costs internalized by municipal governments– also fall with increases in
the recycling rate for all recycling rates over 25%. It is not immediately evident, then,
why municipal governments have not continued to increase their recycling rates and
reduced their own costs in the process.
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1. Introduction
The recycling of household solid waste has become increasingly common across
the globe over the past 25 years. The emergence of residential recycling was unlikely the
consequence of market forces, as rarely was offering curbside recycling services the
brainchild of some private waste collection firm interested in reducing disposal costs or
capturing revenue from the recovery and sale of recyclable materials. Instead, the growth
can be attributable largely to state and federal government mandates. The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act in the United States indirectly resulted in over 82 million
Americans having access to curbside collection of their recyclable waste (Jenkins at al.,
2008). The Landfill Directive has made recycling a national priority in many member
countries of the European Union, and the Law for the Promotion of Sorted Collection and
Recycling of Containers and Packaging has had a similar impact in Japan.
But after steady increases in the recycling rates over much of the 19990’s, the
percentage of residential waste recycled has remained rather steady over the past 10
years. The percentage of residential waste recycled in the United States has grown from
29.0% in 2000 to just 33.2% in 2008 (U.S. E.P.A., 2008). The recycling rate in Japan
was roughly the same in 2007 (20.5%) as it was in 2002 (19.9%). It appears recycling
rates have reached some sort of steady state. The relevant policy question is whether the
steady state is socially optimal.
It is not immediately evident why the growth in recycling rates has slowed.
Although an assortment of other environmental policies have faced increased public
scrutiny over the past decade, the public rhetoric on recycling remains favorable. Instead
of public criticisms, we begin to hear calls for a zero waste society. Caroline Spelman,
the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (a cabinet position within
the United Kingdom government) has asked each local council to develop a strategy to
achieve zero residential solid waste. Scotland has approved a national goal to become the
world's first zero-waste country by 2025.
Perhaps the reasons for the steady recycling rates are economic in nature.
Microeconomic theory might suggest that recovering recyclable materials from the
residential waste stream, like any other production process, may confront diminishing
returns to scale and therefore rising marginal costs. Municipal governments interested in
1

increasing the recycling rate may find the available options too expensive. And because
state or federal laws do not require further increases in the recycling rate, many municipal
governments may have adopted a strategy of sustaining a constant recycling rate. But if
the social marginal costs of increasing the recycling rate fall even as private marginal
costs rise, then municipal decisions may not be efficient.
This paper examines data available for the United States and Japan to estimate
both the net private and net social costs of recycling. The estimated socially optimal
recycling rate is defined as the rate that minimizes the net social costs of managing
residential solid waste. If the optimal recycling rate is estimated to be more/less than the
current observed recycling rates, then state policy requiring recycling could be
strengthened/relaxed. The next section of this paper provides a theoretical context for
why state and federal governments find it necessary to promote household recycling.
External costs associated with waste disposal and external benefits associated with
supplying recycled materials form the core of this argument. Section 3 then uses data
available for the United States to estimate the effectiveness of past municipal strategies
for increasing the recycling rate. The section provides some understanding for how we
have achieved current recycle rates and why they might have stalled. The socially
optimal recycling rate in the United States and Japan is estimated in Section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper with a few policy implications.

2. Asking the Correct Policy Question
What percentage of solid waste should be recycled? Is it none? Is it all? Or is
some share in the middle optimal? The answer is unlikely zero because private firms
have traditionally found recycling profitable for centuries. If, for example, the market
price of scrap aluminum is sufficient to cover the resource costs necessary to disassemble
old tractor trailers to recover the aluminum siding, then the market will certainly do so.
The question must then be restated. How much of the otherwise unwanted waste material
that, by definition, will cost more to collect and process than is valued by society should
society recycle? If the disposal of recyclable materials did not harm the environment or
generate other external costs or benefits and if markets are sufficiently competitive, then
the free market internalizes all social benefits and costs of recycling and will find the
2

optimal quantity (Baumol, 1977). But waste disposal facilities have been estimated to
generate external costs. Neighborhood property values decline, climate change gasses
escape from both landfills and incinerators, and landfills threaten local groundwater
quality. Using recyclable materials rather than their virgin counterparts in industrial
production have also been estimated to reduce air and water pollution. Recycling
therefore generates external benefits, and we must therefore abandon the free market
recycling level and wonder what recycling rate is optimal once the external costs of waste
disposal and external benefits of recycling are considered.
Economists have devoted very little attention to answering this question. Not
because the question is not a good one, but because, given the nature of the external costs
of waste disposal and uncertainties in household and municipal costs to recycle, there is a
better one. If the costs to the economy to abate solid waste through recycling or other
means were perfectly known to policymakers, then determining the optimal quantity to
recycle would not be difficult regardless of the nature of the external costs. The recycling
rate should increase until the rising marginal cost of doing so equals the marginal external
benefit of reducing solid waste. But the costs to households and firms to collect, process
and transport materials for recycling can vary widely across regions of the country and
are largely unknown to policy makers.
In this case, the better question to ask is not what quantity to recycling but what
should be the optimal price of waste disposal. The optimal price should equal to the
external cost of waste disposal, making the choice of price especially easy if otherwise
recyclable solid waste is a pollutant whose incremental effect on the environment is
constant. Marginal external costs are constant if the first unit of solid waste disposed in a
landfill is as nasty to the environment as, say, the 100th unit or the 1,000,000th unit. Each
unit disposed is damaging, but equally damaging as the others. The 100th unit of waste
disposed does not somehow mix with the other 99 units to create some new
environmental problem. Toxic or hazardous waste associated with the disposal of
computers, televisions, and cell phones (such as lead oxide, cadmium, and mercury
imbedded in these products) are not likely to generate constant external costs. For toxic
waste, a threshold can be reached where incremental increases in waste disposal can mix
with existing waste to form new hazards to human health and the natural environment.
3

The optimal price of waste disposal should therefore equal the social marginal
cost of waste disposal. Assuming sufficient competition, market prices for waste disposal
reflect only the private marginal costs. The socially optimal price is established by
assessing a disposal tax equal to the constant external marginal cost of waste disposal.
Individual households, firms, and municipalities that know their own costs to recycle
(even if policy makers do not) will recycle until their own marginal cost is equal to the
after tax price set equal to the social cost of disposal. By choosing the best price,
quantities can go where they may, and any resulting quantity will be economically
efficient.6 Thus a good strategy for reaching efficient levels of solid waste and recycling
is to set a tax equal to the constant external marginal cost of waste disposal.
A related question in the economic literature is where along the waste stream to
assess the tax. One option is to assess a curbside per-bag fee paid by households (Porter,
2002). Concerns have risen over the likelihood of illegal dumping and the high
administrative costs of assessing the tax at the curb (Kinnaman, 2006). The tax could
instead be assessed at the landfill, thus leaving to the municipality the decision over local
policy for how best to abate the waste. A third option is to increase the private cost of
disposal by subsidizing an alternative such as recycling. Deposit-refund programs are
one such example of subsidies paid for recyclable materials (Palmer and Walls, 1997).
Public policy at the municipal level has evolved within this framework. Nearly
all municipalities have avoided mandating recycling quantities from households, perhaps
due to uncertainties and differences in costs to recycling households. Instead, many
municipalities tax waste at the curb by requiring households to purchase special stickers,
tags, or bags. Many more municipalities offer free access to curbside or drop-off
municipal recycling services – in essence subsidizing the household recycling process.
But policy at the state and national level is often based on setting quantity targets. In
response the subtitle D of the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), state
governments established an assortment of recycling quantity targets. Thirty-seven states
in the United States have enacted goals for the recycling rate. California, New Jersey and
Oregon have the authority to penalize local governments that do not achieve the recycling
6

The nature of external costs (constant or rising) is also informing the optimal policy for mitigating climate
change. Carbon taxes would be appropriate if external costs are constant, but cap and trade measures ( a
“quantity” policy) are preferred if carbon dioxide emissions involve rising marginal costs.
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goal, while Florida cannot penalize but can use grant money as an incentive. Only
Arkansas and Virginia have met the recycling goal, while Alabama, Florida, Missouri,
Pennsylvania and South Carolina are within 5% of achieving their targeted recycling rate
(Simmons, 2006). Although several states have also levied landfill disposal taxes, these
taxes are frequently well below the estimated per-ton external marginal cost of waste as
estimated in the economics literature and discussed below.
The European Union followed a similar regulatory approach by managing waste
and recycling quantities rather than establishing optimal prices. The 1999 Landfill
Directive requires all member countries of the European Union to reduce waste by 25%
by 2006, 50% by 2009, and 65% by 2016 from 1995 base levels. The United Kingdom
also serves as an interesting case study for the comparison between quantity and pricebased policy. Britain first attempted to set efficient landfill prices via the use of a landfill
tax, but soon had to raise the tax to levels well above external costs when it became
apparent that the existing prices would not reduce waste by levels necessary to satisfy the
EU landfill directive. Arbitrary targets seemed to trump efficient pricing. The Japanese
government set recycling targets in 1997. Each municipality in Japan is expected to
reduce waste generation by 10%, increase the recycling rate from 11% to 24%, and
reduce waste incineration by 50%. Each municipality in Japan is required to submit a
plan to the Ministry of the Environment outlining plans for obtaining these three goals.
The repeated theme across much of the developed world is the regulatory reliance
on mandated quantity measures for waste and recycling rather than setting optimal prices
as is argued by economic theory. How have municipalities historically increased their
recycling rates? The next section of this paper uses municipal-level data gathered in the
United States to estimate the recycling rate as a function of household demographic
variables and municipal policy measures.

3. Municipal Strategies Employed to Increase the Recycling Rate
Several strategies have been utilized by municipal governments to increase the
recycling rate. Municipalities can implement drop-off centers, implement curbside
recycling, make recycling mandatory, set up a composting program, and charge a per-bag
fee for household waste collection. This section summarizes the results of an empirical
5

model (specified in the Appendix) that estimates the recycling rate as a function of these
policy variables. The model is estimated using data gathered in the United States as
described in Folz (1999). 5,044 municipalities that offered solid waste recycling
services to its households were identified. Surveys were mailed to a randomly selected
sample of 2,096 of these municipalities and were returned by 1,021 (a 48.7% response
rate). Many of these surveys were incomplete perhaps due to incomplete information on
the part of the municipal responders resulting in a usable sample of 398 municipalities.
Several variables that municipal governments have little control over are
estimated to play a role in determining the recycling rate. Most important of these is the
population of the municipality and thus the total amount of solid waste a municipality
must manage. Holding all other variables constant, a one percent increase in the total
quantity of solid waste generated is estimated to decrease the recycling rate by .33%.
Thus, if a small municipality recycles 20%, then an otherwise identical municipality with
identical policies but with twice the population will recycle only 14% of its waste.
Efforts needed to achieve any given level of recycling must therefore be more substantial
in large cities than in small towns. Perhaps social norms supporting recycling behavior
are stronger in small towns than in large cities.
The demographic composition of citizens in the municipality is also estimated to
play a role in determining recycling rates. Tastes for the environment are first among
these. The survey asked the municipal respondent to rate (5 options from very weak to
very strong) the local resident’s level of support for the recycling program. Twenty
percent of municipalities rated very strong, another 47% rated “strong” and 26%
indicated “moderate”. A one point increase in this assessment of residents’ tastes for
recycling is estimated to increases the recycling rate by 17.8%. A municipality with
“strong” resident support for recycling would therefore experience a 3.5% greater
recycling rate relative to a base recycling rate of 20%. Controlling for these
environmental tastes, other demographic differences such as education level, median age,
percentage of owner occupied residences, household size, ethnic origin, and gender
played no significant role in determining differences in recycling rates across
municipalities. The per-capita income of municipal residents does make a difference – a
$1,000 increase in per-capita income is estimated to increase the recycling rate by 5.0%.
6

Recycling rates are also a function of policy decisions of the municipal
government. Recall that all municipalities in the sample run some type of recycling
program. The most basic municipal program could involve developing a non-mandatory
unstaffed drop-off center for residents to deposit recyclable materials. Imagine a site in a
municipal parking lot or near other municipal property with several containers set up to
receive various categories of recyclable materials. According to the model, the recycling
rate increases by 10.4% for each material added. The average number of materials
collected for recycling in the sample is 9.23. The age of this unstaffed drop-off recycling
program is also estimated to make a difference. Each year that passes from the
introduction of drop-off recycling services increases the recycling rate by roughly 1.9%.
Experience allows residents to become aware of the recycling opportunity, to develop
strategies to separate, store, and transport materials to this facility, and possibly to adjust
consumption habits to favor recycling over waste. A municipality with mean levels of all
income and demographic variables described above, and managing the median level of
waste, accepting the median number of materials for recycling, and with nothing but a
non-mandatory drop-off facility with vintage of 8 years (the mean in the sample) is
predicted by the model to recycle only 4.98% of its total waste.
What strategies are available to municipal governments to increase this baseline
recycling rate? First, the municipality could staff the drop-off facility. A staffed drop off
facility usually increases exposure, reduces the theft of valuable metals, and ensures that
materials are not corrupted necessitating disposal in a landfill. Such an initiative is
predicted to increase recycling rate from 4.98% to 6.51%. If the municipality takes the
next step and implements curbside recycling, then the recycling rate is estimated to
increase to 10.67%. If participation in the recycling program is made mandatory, then
the recycling rate is estimated to increases again to 14.84% of all waste. The mandatory
participation laws are rarely enforced, but may alter social norms in favor of recycling.
Adding a municipal composting program will increase the recycling rate again to an
estimated 18.39%.
Municipal governments having made the decision to adopt curbside recycling
have a variety of program options from which to choose. According to the data, most of
these options do not significantly affect the recycling rate. For example, municipal
7

governments can (1) collect recyclable materials on the same day as waste collection or
on a different day, (2) provide recycling containers to households or require households
to place recyclable materials, and (3) either require households to separate materials into
separate containers or require collectors to sort through a single mixed recycling
container to separate materials. None of these three options is estimated to affects the
recycling rate. These options shift the cost of recycling from the household to the
municipality. Choosing among these options might therefore be based on who best can
bear the burden of the costs. Some municipal governments levy an extra recycling fee
paid by households for the right to participate in the curbside recycling program. These
fees are not estimated to affect the recycling rate – thus they do not appear to discourage
households from participating in the recycling program. One program attribute that is
estimated to affect recycling rates is frequency of collection. Among municipalities with
curbside recycling, increasing the number of collections from once per month to once per
week is estimated to increase the recycling rate from 18.39% to roughly 24.42%.
One final option available to the municipality is the implementation of a user fee
for waste collection. Under this program, each household must pay an added fee for each
unit of waste presented at the curb for collection. The implementation of a user fee (of
unobserved value) is estimated to increase the recycling rate by 21.3% - thereby
increasing the recycling rate for the median municipality from 24.4% to an estimated
29.6%. This is the highest predicted recycling rate available to the municipality with
median values of income and demographic variables. Relative to this median
municipality, the predicted recycling rate could increase for municipalities with smaller
populations, higher incomes, or citizens with stronger tastes for the environment.
Recall from above that, other things constant, program maturity is estimated to
increase the recycling rate by 2% per year. This estimated is based on differences in
program maturities observed in 1996, in the midst of a decade when recycling rates were
increasing this estimated effect of program maturity is not likely applicable today as
recycling rates have leveled off in recent years. But if we apply this coefficient, then
recycling rates are predicted to have grown by 23.9% over the past 14 years. The
estimated recycling rate in 2010 for the median municipality would therefore be 36.7%
rather than 26.9%. The municipality could also add more materials to the mix of items
8

households can present for recycling – recall that each additional materials increases the
recycling rate by an average of 10.4%.
Thus, by setting policy municipal governments have demonstrated partial control
over their own recycling rates. The remaining questions are why recycling rates have
leveled off and what recycling rate is socially optimal. The next section addresses these
questions.

4. The Socially Optimal Recycling Rate
Section 2 made clear that the policy focus across much of the developed world
relies at least partially upon setting recycling targets. Yet, nothing is known about what
rate of recycling is socially optimal. The optimal recycling rate minimizes the net social
costs of waste management. The net social cost of municipal waste management includes
first the sum of the budgetary costs to the municipality to operate both a municipal solid
waste collection and disposal program and a municipal recycling program. These
programs require labor, trucks, machinery, land, and administrative services. The
recycling program could involve curbside collection, drop-off recycling facilities, or
both. With either program, recycled materials need to be stored, processed, and
transported to markets that demand recycled materials. These budgetary costs to the
municipality form the private total costs of waste management.
Any recycling materials generated by the municipal waste program serve as
inputs to production to a variety of manufacturing industries. Recycled aluminum, metal,
paper, glass, and some plastics have economic value. With sufficient competition, the
revenue earned on the sale of recycled materials to these industries approximates the
economic value of providing recycled materials.7 This private benefit of recycling is
subtracted from the private total cost of waste management to obtain the net private costs
of waste management.
The disposal of residential solid waste has been estimated to generate external
costs and the use of recycled materials over virgin materials in industrial production has
been estimated to generate external benefits. External costs of waste disposal are
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To the extent that competition is imperfect in markets for recycled materials – the revenues overestimate
(monopoly) or understate (monopsony) the value of these materials.
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associated with the nuisance to neighbors of a landfill or incinerator, pollution and
congestion from garbage trucks, and the emissions of climate gasses. The economics
literature has quantified these external costs to be as high as $4.96 per ton for only
greenhouse emissions and waste transportation externalities (Davies and Doble, 2004),
$4.39 per ton for only neighborhood nuisances (Defra, 2004), and $8.76 per ton
(Kinnaman, 2006) and $15 per ton (Porter, 2002) for all external costs. The external
costs of incineration have been measured to be as high as $20 per ton (Porter, 2002) and
$39 per ton (Dijkgraaf, 2008). Based on this literature, this study will assume the
external costs are $10 per ton for landfill disposal and $40 per ton for incineration. These
per-unit external costs are multiplied by the total quantity of waste landfilled or
incinerated to derive the external total costs of waste disposal.
Generating recycled materials allows manufacturing industries to utilize recycled
materials in production rather than virgin materials. Craighill and Powell (1996) apply a
full life-cycle assessment to estimate the external costs associated with each step of both
the waste disposal and recycling processes. Even after accounting for the extra efforts
necessary to collect and process recyclable materials, using those materials for production
is estimated to reduce both air and water pollution. These external benefits are estimated
at $1,771 per ton of aluminum recycled, $189.96 per ton of glass, $228.42 per ton of
paper, $240.26 per ton of steel, and slightly negative for PET, HDPE, and PVC plastics.
Multiplying these estimates by the quantity of each material supplied by each municipal
recycling program allows for the total external benefit of recycling to be calculated. The
net social cost of waste management is therefore equal to net private costs of waste
management plus the external costs of waste disposal less the external benefits of
providing recycling materials to industry. The socially optimal recycling rate is that rate
that minimizes this net social cost of waste management.8

Estimating the Socially Optimal Recycling Rate in the United States

8

Note that any state subsidies received by municipalities from state governments are not included in the
analysis since these subsidies reflect transfers from state taxpayers. These subsidies can be substantial.
The most common method of funding state programs is solid waste disposal fees/landfill surcharges,
followed by budget appropriations.
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The data made available by Folz (1999) are once again useful to calculating the
net social cost of waste management in the United States. Although the survey included
38 questions, only a few are relevant to the net social costs of waste management. The
important survey questions included, “What was the total collection and disposal cost for
all non-recycled municipal solid wastes in 1996?” and “What was the total cost of just the
city’s recycling program in 1996?” The survey goes on to ask, “About how much total
revenue, if any, was obtained from the sale of recycled materials collected in your city in
1996?” Subtracting this latter amount from the sum of the first two amounts provide the
net private costs of waste management. Another question asked each municipality to
provide the “Total tons of municipal solid waste disposed or incinerated in 1996?” The
amounts provided are multiplied by $10 (for landfill disposal) and $40 (for incineration)
to estimate the external costs of waste disposal. Finally, the survey asked municipalities,
“For the materials in your recycling program, about how many tons of each was collected
in 1996?” Respondents indicated tons of aluminum, newspaper, glass, and all types of
plastics. These reported quantities are multiplied by the corresponding estimated external
marginal cost of recycling each material (as reported above) to estimate the overall
external benefits of recycling. The sample contains a wide variety of municipalities – the
minimum population is just 39 persons and the maximum is 8.57 million. The average
calculated net social cost is just over $5.86 million, but varies widely with a standard
deviation of $48.8 million.
The question at hand is estimating which recycling rate minimizes the net social
costs of waste. The recycling rate varies in the sample between 1% and 81% with a mean
of 16.7%. Increases in the recycling rate could require additional labor and capital, but
reduces the use of the landfill, provides resources to manufacturers, and the use of those
resources on net reduces air and water pollution. If the latter measures exceed the first,
then the increase in the recycling rate would decrease the net social costs associated with
managing residential solid waste. A flexible functional form econometric model is
utilized to estimate how the net social costs of waste management are affected by changes
in the recycling rate. The details of all regressions are described in the Appendix.
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Based on the results of the econometric estimation, the best-fit lines associating
the recycling rate to both the net private and net social costs of managing household are
provided in Figure 1.

Net Costs of Recycling in United States
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The estimated best-fit line suggests the net private costs of waste management
increase with the recycling rate up to a rate of about 25% and then decreases with
additional increases of the recycling rate. Rather than facing increasing marginal costs to
recycle attributable to diminishing marginal returns to recycling inputs, it appears that
economies to scale are very prominent in residential recycling. Callan and Thomas
(2001) and Bohm et al. (2010) also estimate economies to scale in the provision of
municipal recycling. Particularly troubling is the observation that the observed steady
state recycling rate in the United States, at about 28%, is near the top of the estimated net
private cost curve. Municipal governments internalize only the private costs and benefits
of recycling, yet appear to be maximizing their costs. Municipal (net private) costs could
decrease by either increasing the recycling rate by taking advantage of economies of
scale, or decreasing the recycling rate and reducing costs of resources.
The recycling rate that minimizes the net social costs of recycling is estimated to
be zero. The economic value of municipal resources necessary to recycle even a small
percentage of the waste stream is estimated to exceed the savings in waste disposal
(private and external) and the value of producing recycled materials (private and
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external). According to the graph above, the social cost of recycling 28% of the waste
stream increase net social costs from about $5.7 million to $6.9 million (for a
municipality that manages roughly 137,000 tons of waste – the mean in the sample). If
the average household of 2.25 persons generates 50 pounds of waste per week, then
137,000 tons is consistent with a human population of about 237,000 persons. The
estimated increase in net social costs of waste management for a variety of municipality
sizes is listed in the Table below.

Waste

TSC at zero

TSC at 28%

Increase

Per-capital

Persons

(tons)

(millions)

(millions)

(millions)

Increase ($)

50,000

29,000

$1.34

$1.62

$0.28

$5.60

237,000

137,000

$5.73

$6.94

$1.21

$5.11

1,000,000

578,000

$22.04

$26.68

$4.64

$4.64

5,000,000

2,890,000

$99.36

$120.26

$20.90

$4.18

10,000,000

5,780,000

$190.03

$230.01

$39.98

$4.00

Thus, a municipal recycling program serving one million persons that achieves a
recycling rate of 28% increases the social total costs of waste management by roughly
$4.64 per person per year over the socially optimal recycling rate of zero. On average, a
family of four incurs an additional $18.56 in social costs for its municipality to achieve a
28% recycling rate (the U.S. average). This amount is certainly not going to break the
family budget. Perhaps the take away message from this estimation is that net social
costs of waste management are rather constant across the recycling rate spectrum.
But that the estimated net social cost of recycling falls, albeit slightly, with all
increases in the recycling rates above 10% is an important result. If society is committed
to a positive level of municipal recycling, then net social costs can be minimized by
maximizing the rate of recycling – perhaps to 100%. If municipal governments do not
internalize all costs and benefits of waste management, then mandates set at state or
national levels may be necessary to increase the recycling rate. This conclusion is
13

especially true for municipalities recycling less than 25% of waste. These municipalities
face rising net private costs of increasing the recycling rate even as net social costs
decrease.
The regression controls for other variables expected to affect the net social cost of
waste management. Most of these variables are not estimated to significantly affect the
net social cost, but two play a role. First, the use of curbside recycling rather than the
establishment of drop-off sites is estimated to increase the net social costs of waste
management by 39% for any given recycling rate. Second, every $10 increase in the
tipping fee, the per-ton cost to dispose waste in a landfill or incinerator, is estimated to
increase the net social costs by 5.7% for any given recycling rate. Other economic
variables such as the wage rate, the interest rate, and the price of fuel had no significant
effect on net social costs.

Estimating the Socially Optimal Recycling Rate in Japan
Japan stands out among perhaps every other country in the world in terms of
making available for public consumption high quality data on residential solid waste and
recycling. Beginning in 1979, the Ministry of Environment in Japan organized a
centralized data gathering process whereby each of the 1,700 Japanese municipalities
submitted waste management data to its prefecture government (a prefecture government
is similar to a state government in the U.S.). Each prefecture compiles and submits the
municipal data to the Ministry of the Environment, which then makes the data available
for public consumption. This hierarchical data gathering process is used in many areas of
Japanese government including employment, agriculture, manufacturing, and education.
In recent years the data gathering process has been performed electronically.9 Included in
the municipal data are quantities of waste generation, recycling, costs of waste
management and recycling, and a multitude of specific program variables such as the
number of trucks utilized and salaries paid to waste management workers. Data on
market prices of each recyclable material necessary to calculate private benefits of
recycling were also obtained from the Ministry of the Environment.

9
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Data are obtained for every Japanese municipality over an eight year period
(2001-2008). The panel nature of this data allow for the use of econometric methods that
eliminate potential biases resulting from unobserved municipal variables that may affect
recycling rates and costs but do not vary across time. That the data are available for the
population of Japanese municipalities eliminates any self-selection bias that might occur
in a sample. Finally, the Japanese data are more recent than that obtained in the United
States (1996).
United States and Japan share much in common in regards to solid waste
management. Matsuto and Ham (1990) examine the contents of actual waste generated
by a sample of households in Madison, Wisconsin and Sapporo, Japan. The average
individual in Madison generated 1,016.4 grams of waste per day. Compared to 866 grams
generated by the average household each day in Sapporo – about 17% more. The average
individual in Madison recycled 22% of waste, compared to 21% in Sapporo. The average
individual in the Madison generated slightly more paper, metal, and slightly less glass,
textiles, and food waste when compared to the average individual in Sapporo. The
quantity of plastics and bulky waste are estimated to be about equal across the two
municipalities. Although disposal patterns are not identical, these data suggest that
managing waste in these two municipalities share many similarities. Two differences can
be identified. First, population densities are much higher in Japanese municipalities
relative to U.S. municipalities. Increasing the recycling rate by adding new households
may be less costly if collection occurs in densely populated apartment building districts
rather than sprawling suburban neighborhoods as is more common in the United States.
Japan is also more likely to use incineration than landfilling.
The net social costs of managing waste in Japan is calculated, once again, by
summing the (1) private costs to collect waste, (2) private costs to collect and process
recycled materials, and (3) the external costs of waste disposal ($10 per ton for land
disposal or $40 per ton for incineration). The revenue gained from the sale of recyclable
materials and the external benefits of supplying recycled materials are then subtracted to
arrive at the net social costs of waste management. The relationship between the net
social cost and the recycling rate was estimated using the same flexible functional form
model as used above for the United States data. The estimated best-fit relationship is
15

illustrated below in Figure 2, where the quantity of waste managed, the wage, and the
number of materials collected is held constant at the same levels as above. The best-fit
private net cost curves for the United States are also added to provide perspective for
comparing costs across the two countries.

Figure 2: Net Costs of Recycling
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A few differences arise when comparing the estimated best fit lines for Japan with
those of the Unites States. Over much of the range of recycling rates, the net private
costs of managing waste in Japan are less than for the United States. Perhaps high urban
population densities in Japan make collecting waste less costly. Also notice that the
optimal recycling rate is Japan is not zero. Increases in the recycling rate are estimated to
have no statistical effect on the net social costs of waste management – the best fit line is
essentially flat.10
Also of interest is the minimal difference between the best fit lines for these two
countries. If the statistical relationship between the net social costs of recycling and the
recycling rate is similar across all developed countries, and if that statistical relationship

10

The estimated coefficients on the recycling rate and its squared terms had small standard errors, but
because the coefficient estimates are themselves very close to zero, we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis of no statistical relationship between the recycling rate and the SNC. Municipal recycling
services in Japan are costless in a social sense.
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suggests that recycling plays very little role in determining net social costs, then global
recycling efforts have not implication on net social costs. Nations are free to enact
recycling regulations as rigid or lax as they wish without demonstrably affecting net
social costs. The similarities in the best fit lines also suggest that omitted variables bias
in the United States data do not significantly affect results. Recall that the fixed-effects
econometric models for the Japanese data eliminate bias from unobserved variables that
are constant across time.
The Japanese data also allow for the estimation of how recycling each specific
material affects the net social costs of waste management. Each municipality in Japan
reports the quantity recycled of each of six categories of materials (metal, paper, glass,
PET plastic, other plastics, and other materials). Holding constant the quantity of other
materials at their mean levels, Figure 3 illustrates how the net social costs change with
increases from zero for each of these six specific materials. The length of each best-fit
line reflects the observed recycling rates. No municipality in Japan, for example,
recycles more that 2% of its overall waste in the form of PET plastic.
Examining these best fit lines suggests that recycling PET plastic and “other”
materials increases the net social costs of waste management. Municipalities or national
governments interested in reducing social costs could eliminate these materials from the
waste steam. But recycling metal (aluminum cans and bi-metal cans comprised mostly of
steel), glass, paper, and plastic serves to reduce the net social costs of waste management.
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Figure 3: The Social Total Cost of Recycling
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Data obtained both in the United States and Japan suggest that the net social costs
of recycling either remain constant (in Japan) or fall with increases in the recycling rate
above 8% (in the United States). Policies in the United States that serve to increase the
recycling rate over existing levels would therefore be socially beneficial. But recycling
rates in both counties have remained relatively constant or grown only slightly over the
past decade. One possible reason could be the rising costs faced my municipal
governments. But results here also suggest that the net private costs of recycling – those
costs internalized by municipal governments– also fall with increases in the recycling rate
for all recycling rates over 25%. It is not immediately evident, then, why municipalities
do not continue to increase their recycling rates and reduce their own costs in the process.
One possible reason, not considered in this paper, is that costs to recycling
households may increase with their won recycling levels. If household costs to prepare,
separate, and store, materials increase with their own recycling rate, then households may
rationally choose a recycling rate for less than what might be optimal for a municipal or
societal perspective. Municipalities stand ready to accept all materials presented by
households for recycling, but might be out of policy options to increase recycling
18

quantities. Enforcing mandatory recycling ordinances might be costly and politically
offensive. Sharp increases in curbside taxes necessary to change household behavior
might encourage illegal dumping of waste. Offering large recycling subsidies for
recyclable materials might also be costly.
State and national governments could play some role in indirectly promoting
household recycling efforts. The difference between net social costs and net private costs
for the median municipality of 237,000 people is estimated to be almost 3 million dollars
per year both in the United States and Japan (by inspection of Figure 2). This estimate
justifies the use of state or federal grants designed to promote household recycling. If
instead state and national governments wish to target waste and recycling prices rather
than their quantities, as is suggested by economic theory, then setting state or national
waste taxes at roughly $10 (for landfill disposal) and $40 (for incineration) as well as perton subsidies of amounts estimated by Craighill et al. (1995) would alter municipal
incentives.
Finally, results here are somewhat supportive of a zero-waste society as defined
recently in Scotland and other parts of the world. Although only a few municipalities
have sustained recycling rates in excess of 50%, the trend line estimated by the full data
set suggest the net social costs of waste decrease with increases in the recycling rate. The
estimated net social costs of recycling 100% of waste in the United States are X –
compared to Y for zero. In Japan its Z compared to A.
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Appendix
Let yi denote the recycling rate and let zi represent a vector of (k) municipal level
household demographic characteristics and waste policy variables in municipality i.
Assume, ln(yi) = a + bkzi + ui, where ui represents unobserved variable that affect the
recycling rate in municipality i. Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the parameters a
and bk are provided in Table 1. These coefficients are discussed in Section 3 of the
paper.
Table 1: Determinants of the Recycling Rate (Dependent variable = Ln(Rec Rate))
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

Significance

3.773
-0.332

1.830
0.082

Curbside Fee for Waste

0.186
-0.005
0.005
-0.245
-0.005
0.0000499
0.006
-0.004
-0.024
0.017
0.104
0.268
0.495
0.330
0.214
0.495

0.066
0.008
0.005
0.446
0.008
0.0000204
0.010
0.005
0.016
0.010
.0035
0.102
0.172
0.089
0.117
0.172

5% level
1% level
1% level
5% level
10% level
1% level
1% level
1% level
1% level
1% level

Curbside Per-Bag Tax

0.213

0.103

CONSTANT
Ln (Total Waste)
Environmental Tastes
Percent Female
Percent White
Household Size
Percent Owner Occupied
Household Income
White Collar Employment
Percent College Graduate
Median Age of Residents
Age of Recycling Program
Number of Materials
Staffed Drop-Off Facility
Curbside Collection
Mandatory Participation
Compost Program

1% level
5% level

2

N = 398; R = 0.484
Next, let yi denote net private costs of waste management, let xi denote the recycling rate,
and zi represent a vector of k other exogenous variables in municipality i. A non-linear
flexible functional form relating yi to xi is given by ln(yi) = a + b1 ln(xi) + b2 [ln(xi]2 +
gkzi + ui, where ui represents unobserved variable that affect the net private costs in
municipality i. Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the parameter are provided in Table
2. The same model is applied to the data from Japan. Fixed-effects estimates of the
parameters for Japan also appear in Table 2. These estimated coefficients are used to
generate the best fit lines illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
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Table 2: The Net Private Costs of Recycling (independent variable is LN(PC))
United States

Japan

Variable

OLS
Estimates

Robust
Standard Errors

Fixed Effects
Estimates

Standard Errors

LN(recycle rate)

0.446***

0.106

0.044*

0.024

[LN(recycle rate)]^2

-0.068***

0.025

0.006

0.004

LN(total waste)

0.903***

0.028

0.450***

0.020

0.013

0.024

0.004***

0.001

Ln(wage)

0.841***

0.297

0.045***

0.005

Constant

2.391***

0.880

10.267***

0.188

Number of Materials

N = 10.275; R2 = 0.08 (within),
0.90 (between), and 0.89 (overall)

N = 372; R2 = 0.810

Table 3: The Net Social Costs of Recycling (independent variable is LN(SC))
United States

Japan

OLS
Estimates

Robust
Standard Errors

Fixed Effects
Estimates

Standard Errors

LN(recycle rate)

0.226**

0.072

-0.025

0.029

[LN(recycle rate)]^2

-0.051*

0.020

0.003

0.006

LN(total waste)

0.936**

0.032

0.420**

0.025

Number of Materials

-0.0003

0.028

0.005**

0.001

Ln(wage)

0.399

0.331

0.055**

0.007

Constant

3.647**

0.880

10.623**

Variable

0.238
2

N = 10.260; R = 0.04 (within),
0.88 (between), and 0.86 (overall)

N = 345; R2 = 0.774

The model was then expanded for the Japanese case by eliminating the two “recycling
rate” variables and adding variables (log and log squared) on each of many recycled
materials including paper, metal, glass, PET plastic, other plastics, and other materials.
Because natural logs are used, municipalities with 0 levels of recycling any of the
materials were dropped from the data. Results are given in Table 4, and best-fit lines are
illustrated in Figure 3.
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Table 3: The Social Total Cost of Recycling in Japan
(independent variable is LN(STC))
Fixed Effects
Estimate (B)

Robust
Standard Errors

Significance
Level

LN(paper recycle rate)

-0.081

0.021

1% level

[LN(paper recycle rate)]^2

-0.001

0.006

-

LN(metal recycle rate)

-0.030

0.020

-

[LN(metal recycle rate)]^2

-0.045

0.009

1% level

LN(glass recycle rate)

-0.016

0.023

-

[LN(glass recycle rate)]^2

-0.048

0.012

1% level

LN(PET recycle rate)

0.141

0.031

1% level

[LN(PET recycle rate)]^2

0.035

0.009

1% level

LN(plastic recycle rate)

-0.018

0.008

5% level

[LN(plastic recycle rate)]^2

0.000

0.002

-

LN(other recycle rate)

0.037

0.006

1% level

[LN(other recycle rate)]^2

0.004

0.002

5% level

LN(total waste)

0.386

0.047

1% level

Number of Materials

-0.001

0.002

-

Ln(wage)

0.090

0.010

1% level

Constant

11.457

0.456

1% level

Variable

N = 4,736; R2 (within) = 0.122; R2 (between) = 0.866; R2 (overall) = 0.866
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